Supreme Court Review: Top 10 judgements of 2024

The end of the year provides us at the Supreme Court Observer an opportunity to reflect on the Court’s activity over the past 12 months. As 2024 nears its close, we have compiled our list of the top 10 judgements for the year. These decisions, in our view, stand out for their significant political, economic and social impact.

It has been an eventful year for the Court (almost 1000 judgements), and, as a consequence, for the SCO. As you can imagine, identifying just 10 landmark judgements from the Court’s huge output was not straightforward. Our guiding light while putting together this list was ‘impact’: we filtered the set of judgements through the lens of the effect they could potentially have on large and critical constituencies such as taxpayers, homeowners, voters and minorities. Here goes: 

1) Withdrawal of remission granted to Bilkis Bano convicts | Bilkis Yakub Rasool v Union of India | Two-judge bench

A judgement that quashed the Gujarat government’s order to release 11 convicts in the Bilkis Bano case was the first big decision to make headlines from the Supreme Court in 2024. The convicts were sentenced for life for the gang rape and murder of Bano’s family during the 2002 Gujarat Riots. It was a crime that had shocked the conscience of large sections of the nation. Notably, the convicts were sentenced in Mumbai, making the Maharashtra government the appropriate authority to consider remission.

The judgement suggests that the Gujarat government was aware of the convicts’ mischief of applying to the wrong government and still considered their application. The judgement put on record that the Gujarat government, run by the Bharatiya Janata Party, acted “in tandem” with the convicts. Justice B.V. Nagarathna’s opinion reiterated that remission applications can only be considered if convicts respect the rule of law. Further, the judgements stated that although the decision to release convicts rests in the administrative domain, courts have the authority to quash remission orders. 

2) Validity of the Electoral Bonds Scheme | Association of Democratic Reforms v Union of India | Five-judge bench 

In the lead-up to the 2024 Lok Sabha Elections, a five-judge bench quashed the 2018 Electoral Bond Scheme. The EB Scheme allowed corporations, individuals and organisations to donate anonymously to political parties. On 15 February 2024, the Court unanimously held that voters had a right to be informed about the sources of party funding. The Court found that the 2018 Scheme was not foolproof, and did not fulfil the Union’s justification of wanting to protect donors from adverse actions by rival political parties. In a boost to free and fair elections, the Court ordered the immediate halt of bond sales and asked the Election Commission and the State Bank of India to publicly disclose the data they had hitherto collected on EB transactions. 

Citizens, journalists and researchers scoured through the data, drawing connections between donations, on the one hand, and profitable government tenders and abrupt halting of criminal investigations, on the other. In August, however, the Court refused to set up a Special Investigation Team to probe allegations of quid pro quo, stating that the allegations were mere “assumptions”. 

3) Bail for Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal | Arvind Kejriwal v Directorate of Enforcement | Two-judge bench 

The Arvind Kejriwal bail saga had the effect of relaxing the stringent interpretation of the bail norms in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002. Kejriwal was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) for his alleged role in the Delhi Liquor Policy scam. He was also arrested by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on corruption charges in connection with the same scam. The Supreme Court noted that Kejriwal had suffered long periods of incarceration and that the trial in his case was unlikely to commence in the foreseeable future.

The Court’s decision seemed to open the doors for the release of other incarcerated Opposition political leaders like Manish Sisodia, K. Kavitha and V. Senthil Balaji. Many of the subsequent orders, too, referred to the delay in commencement of trial. More than once, the Court reiterated the maxim of “bail is the rule, jail is the exception” in the context of PMLA cases. These developments suggested that the Court has come a long way since Vijay Madanlal, the July 2022 case where it had upheld the onerous bail conditions under the PMLA. The Kejriwal case also opened a new aspect to determine the validity of an arrest under the PMLA, one of “need and necessity”.

4) Validity of sub-classification within reserved categories | State of Punjab v Davinder Singh | Seven-judge bench 

In a potentially far-reaching judgement on the affirmative action jurisprudence in the country, a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court upheld states’ power to create sub-classification within the reserved Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe categories (SC/ST). In a 6:1 majority, the bench led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud overturned E.V. Chinnaiah v Union of India (2004). 

The majority reasoned that sub-classification was permissible to ensure “substantive equality” since different communities in the SC/ST list faced varying degrees of discrimination and inequality. The bench, however, held that any law creating sub-classification had to be based on empirical evidence and would be subject to judicial review.

In the wake of the judgement, several state governments indicated that they were keen to advance sub-classification. Haryana was the first to do so—weeks after the judgement, the Nayab Singh Saini-led BJP government approved the Haryana Scheduled Caste Commission Report, which recommended a 10 percent ‘sub-quota’ for deprived SCs in government jobs. Earlier this month, Telangana chief minister Revanth Reddy announced that the Commission constituted by his government to study sub-classification would submit its report. Reddy’s Congress government has made it clear that there would be a positive outcome for the Madiga community, which was prominent in spearheading the movement in favour of sub-classification. 

5) Taxation of mines and minerals and regulation of industrial alcohol | Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India; State of UP v Lalta Prasad Vaish | Nine-judge bench

Two nine-judge benches dealt with the distribution of law-making powers between the Union and state governments this year. In Mineral Area Development Authority, an 8:1 majority held that Parliament’s power to make laws on mines and minerals cannot be extended so far that it usurps states’ powers to legislate on the subject. In Lalta Prasad Vaish, in a similar majority, the Supreme Court found that the Union’s powers under List I of the Seventh Schedule cannot be used to take away the powers that List II has vested in the states. Thus, state governments had the power to regulate industrial alcohol. 

In these cases, which were seen as a shot in the arm for state autonomy, the majority found that a clear division of legislative powers between the states and the centre was critical for maintaining India’s federal structure. They stressed on the importance of interpreting the two Lists in a way that ensured that states’ law-making powers were not read narrowly. 

Interestingly, Justice Nagarathna dissented and expressed similar concerns in both cases. She observed that the Union having control of critical subjects like minerals and industrial alcohol allowed the central government to take decisions that would prevent uneven economic development and discourage inter-state rivalries. “It is all important that this edifice is not dislodged while attempting to dynamically interpret the Constitution,” she wrote. 

6) Possessing child pornography punishable under POCSO Act | Just Rights for Children Alliance v S. Harish | Two-judge bench

As a result of the Supreme Court’s judgement in Just Rights for Children Alliance v S Harish on 24 September 2024, India is now part of a club of jurisdictions which have explicitly criminalised the viewing, storing and possession of ‘child pornography’. In his judgement, Justice J.B Pardiwala objected to the use of the phrase in formal contexts and noted that it should be called ‘child sexual abuse and exploitative material’ or ‘CSEAM’. For years, High Courts had been struggling to coherently answer whether ‘mere possession’ of explicit videos involving children came under the purview of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. 

Justice Pardiwala, alongside former CJI Chandrachud, clarified that Section 15 of the POCSO Act clearly recognised that both possession of the material and failing to delete and destroy it, and possessing it with the intent of distribution, were punishable offences. Justice Pardiwala also found that the ‘safe harbour’ clause under Section 79 of Information Technology Act, 2000, which immunises intermediaries from liability for third-party information, does not apply to ‘child pornography.’ Now, if intermediaries don’t “expeditiously” take down such material after the government informs them, their safe harbour protection will lapse. The judgement has been a bitter pill to swallow for social media intermediaries, who have highlighted the practical challenges of complying with the judgement.

7) Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act (Assam Accord) | In re: Section 6A of Citizenship Act | Five-judge bench 

This case questioned whether Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, introduced to implement the Assam Accord of 1985, violated Articles 11, 14, 29, 326 and 355. The Accord sought to resolve the tensions caused by the influx of refugees into Assam in the wake of the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. It grants citizenship to those who entered before 24 March 1971, bringing legal certainty to thousands of immigrants who have lived in Assam for decades without clarity over their citizenship. 

The judgement upheld Section 6A in a 4:1 majority. Rejecting claims that the provision dilutes Assamese culture and amounts to external aggression, the majority acknowledged Assam’s distinct identity and emphasised that Assam’s cultural concerns arose from non-implementation of the provision rather than the provision itself. However, the majority judgement fell short of the expectations of constituencies of native Assamese, who wished for the cut-off date for citizenship to be pushed back two more decades to 1951. 

This case exemplifies a deeper tension within India’s democracy: the challenge of accommodating displaced populations while safeguarding the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identities of regional communities. In Assam, where the interplay of migration, ethnicity and language is particularly sensitive, Section 6A remains both a product of compromise and a flashpoint for debates about identity and inclusion.

8) Private property as a material resource | Property Owners Association v State of Maharashtra | Nine-judge bench 

In a Constitution Bench matter that was one of the longest-pending in the Supreme Court, the nine-judge bench had to grapple with two significant questions: 

1. Whether Article 31C continued to exist in the Constitution after the decision in Minerva Mills v Union of India (1980) 
2. Whether privately owned property was a “material resource of the community” under Article 39(b) of the Constitution.

On 5 November 2024, a nine-judge bench unanimously held that Article 31C continued to exist in the Constitution. This provision protects laws that advance Directive Principles enshrined under Article 39(b) and (c) against fundamental rights challenges. This means that any law enacted to give effect to the wealth redistribution principles under 39(b) and (c) cannot be challenged on the ground that they violate fundamental rights. 

 In an 8:1 majority, the judges also held that not all privately owned property was a “material resource of the community” under Article 39(b). The majority led by CJI Chandrachud reasoned that private property could be a material resource if it fulfilled certain criteria like availability, nationalisation, acquisition etc. If the Court held that all private property was a material resource of the community, CJI Chandrachud said, it would contradict the Constitution’s ideal of “economic democracy”. 

9) Minority status of AMU | Aligarh Muslim University v Naresh Agarwal | Seven-judge bench 

The Supreme Court overruled a 57-year-old precedent set by a five-judge bench in Azeez Basha v Union of India (1967). Azeez Basha had found that Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) does not have a minority status under Article 30 as it was established through a Union legislation (the AMU Act of 1920). In a 4:3 majority in the present case, the Court held that institutions incorporated by a legal instrument can have a minority status if the founder was a person from the minority community. It also put down specific parameters to determine the minority status of any religious or linguistic educational institution established under Article 30. 

This was the first time when the Supreme Court, in 75 years, laid down such indicators. The parameters will assist a smaller bench in determining whether AMU is a minority institution or not. They are also likely to be applied in other cases where an institution seeks to control its own affairs, especially when it comes to reserving seats for students from a particular community. The present case reached the Court after AMU decided to reserve 50 percent seats in postgraduate medical courses for Muslim candidates in 2005. 

10) Guidelines to curb illegal bulldozer demolitions | In Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures | Two-judge bench 

Two years after homes of the Muslim individuals accused in the Jahangirpuri communal violence were bulldozed by authorities, the Court issued detailed directions to curb such demolitions nationwide. In September 2024, a bench took up the matter after a long hiatus, prompted by the bulldozing of the home of a Muslim auto-rickshaw driver. The action had been taken after his Muslim tenant’s son had stabbed a Hindu classmate. 

The Supreme Court ruled that bulldozer demolitions of this nature infringed fundamental rights, such as the right to shelter, diluted the separation of powers by making the executive judge and jury and undermined the rule of law. The bench also laid down some procedural guidelines: a written notice to be served to the owner-occupier at least fifteen days ahead, keeping collectors and district magistrates in the loop about notices and ensuring personal hearings before a designated authority. It also held that the ground-level government officers would pay from their own pockets if any procedure is violated. 

The decision addressed a serious case of executive overreach—more than 150,000 homes were razed and over 700,000 people, mainly Muslim, had been rendered homeless by bulldozing action in two years.