‘Complete justice’ under Article 142 of the Constitution

Transcript:

Hello everyone and welcome to SCO’s channel!

I am Sai Spandana.

Recently, the Supreme Court granted Atul Kumar, a Dalit student, an admission to the Indian Institute of Technology in Dhanbad. Atul had scored very well in the entrance exam but had been unable to make the payment of the admission fee of Rs. 17,500 in time.

“A talented student like the petitioner, who belongs to a marginalized group of citizens and has done everything in his power to secure admission, should not be left in the lurch,” the Court order said.

“The power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do substantial justice is meant precisely to cover such a situation.”

In this episode, we will explore the many facets of Article 142 and how it has evolved over the years.

Article 142 is a unique provision. It grants the Supreme Court the power to pass any order necessary to secure complete justice. Its draft, Article 118, was adopted by the Constituent Assembly without any debate. This meant that the demarking of its scope was left entirely to the Court.

A recent empirical study by IIM Ahmedabad has shown that the Court has mentioned Article 142 or the phrase complete justice in 1579 cases between 1950 and 2023, most of them were civil cases. The study also found that the Court has explicitly used its powers under Article 142 only in 791 cases.

In its first few decades, the Court was especially sparing in its use of Article 142. In *Prem Chand Garg* 1962, the Court had been called upon to examine whether the provision enabled it to pass rules that would restrict the scope of Article 32. A five-judge bench had answered in the negative. Speaking for the majority, Justice Gajendragadkar wrote that an order passed to secure complete justice “must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws.”

But as the Court got busier, there were more frequent invocations of Article 142, especially since the 1990s. In *Delhi Judicial Service Association* 1991, the top court noted that its powers under Article 142 were “entirely of a different level and of a different quality.” It added that prohibitions or limitations contained under ordinary laws could not restrict its “constitutional power” under Article 142.

Later that year, the Court echoed the same view in *Union Carbide* while ordering that the chemical company pay a compensation of over $470 million to the victims of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

A few years later, in *Vinay Chandra Mishra* 1995, a three-judge bench finally held that the precedent in *Prem Chand Garg* was not a “good law.” Article 142, the bench said, was a “constitutional power” that cannot be limited or conditioned by any statutory provisions.

After this, we notice attempts to check this expansive power. In *Supreme Court Bar Association* 1998, a five-judge bench held that Article 142 could not “supplant” the existing substantive law applicable to the case.

There were traces of this in the 2000s as well. In *State of Karnataka v Umadevi* 2006, the Court held that it would not grant any relief under Article 142, which would amount to “perpetuating an illegality.”

The trend, however, seems to have reversed again in recent years. In 2017, the court used Article 142 to ban liquor sales within 500 metres of national highways. In May last year, a five-judge bench exercised its power under Article 142 to recognise irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. This judgment paved the way for a no-fault divorce jurisprudence, despite the ground not existing under personal laws in India.

Earlier this year, the Court relied on the provision to set aside the mayoral elections in Chandigarh. But this year, however, has also seen cases that may illustrate an opposite trend. In *High Court Bar Association, Allahabad*, a five-judge bench clarified that Article 142 could not be invoked to automatically vacate stay orders passed by High Courts.

In a recent arbitration matter, a Constitution Bench cautioned against using the discretionary powers under Article 142 to appoint arbitrators.

Now, looking at the different ways in which the court has used this provision, one might say that it’s a mug’s game to subject a discretionary power to this kind of pattern analysis. But an integral part of our mission here at the Supreme Court Observer is to discern a rationale for what may sometimes appear as the Court’s haphazard jurisprudential evolution.

The boundary between restraint and overreach could be blurry, and an assessment of which side the Court lands is often clouded by the analyser’s own understanding of the social and political imperatives. But as long as there are intersections between law and public life, there will be a place for the Court’s discretionary power under Article 142. And as long as the rule of law prevails, there will be calls to use it sparingly, at each time upholding the constitutional principles and respecting the separation of powers.

This brings us to the end of this video. What do you think of the Court’s discretionary powers? Tell us in the comments below.

As always, stay tuned to scobserver.in for more stories from the Supreme Court and be sure to follow us on all social media platforms.

Thank you for watching!