16 Constitution Bench judgements by D.Y. Chandrachud as Chief Justice

On 10 November 2024, Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud will retire after eight years at the Supreme Court. Two of those years were as the 50th Chief Justice of India. During his tenure as Chief Justice, he actively discharged his administrative duties as Master of the Roster, constituting several five-, seven-, and nine-judge Constitution Benches to resolve long-pending constitutional questions.

Here, we recap all the benches CJI Chandrachud constituted over the last two years, organised by bench strength, beginning with five-judge cases.

Group of Companies Doctrine in Arbitration Proceedings | 5-judge bench

Cox and Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt. Ltd. | Judgement: 6 December 2023

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, P.S. Narasimha J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J

The first Constitution Bench case under CJI Chandrachud concerned the “group of companies” doctrine in arbitration. The bench considered whether non-signatory companies could be included in arbitration proceedings if they were closely related to signatories of an arbitration agreement.

Former Chief Justice N.V. Ramana had referred the case to the Constitution Bench, questioning the correctness of Chloro Controls v Severn Trent Water Purification (2012), which allowed non-signatories to be bound by arbitration agreements. Arguments took place over five days in March and April 2023. Petitioners and the Union government argued that the Arbitration Act does not prevent the application of the group of companies e doctrine since the term “party” could include non-signatories.

Respondents argued that the doctrine should apply only if the non-signatory consented, as a party not signing an agreement generally indicates a lack of intent to be bound.

On 6 December 2023, the bench unanimously held that the doctrine is applicable in arbitration agreements. They observed that a non-signatory party’s conduct can indicate consent to be bound by the agreement, and that the requirement for a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Act does not preclude including non-signatories.

Plea for marriage equality | 5-judge bench

Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v Union of India | Judgement: 17 October 2023

Bench: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, S.K. Kaul J, S.R. Bhat J, Hima Kohli J, P.S. Narasimha J

Within a month of the reference, CJI Chandrachud constituted a five-judge bench to hear petitions seeking the right to marry for sexual minorities. Reports noted that Justice Kaul’s inclusion added “additional gravitas” since the second senior-most judge has rarely served as an associate judge on a Constitution Bench.

Arguments began on 18 April 2023. Petitioners argued that “man” and “woman” in Section 4(c) of the Special Marriage Act (SMA), 1954 should be interpreted as “any person” so as to include non-heterosexual relationships. Their argument was based on the idea that a fundamental right to marry existed under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution.

The Union argued that the Court is not the appropriate authority to recognise marriages for sexual minorities. They further stated the SMA is meant to cover inter-caste and inter-faith heterosexual unions. They also contended that the Constitution does not recognise a fundamental right to marry.

The bench unanimously agreed that there is no fundamental right to marry, and that marriages between sexual minorities cannot be read into the SMA. All five judges confirmed that transgender persons in heterosexual relationships can marry under existing law. In a 3:2 majority, the bench held that the Constitution does not recognise “civil unions” for sexual minorities to access marital benefits. Finally, the majority also held that non-heterosexual partners cannot adopt. 

Altering rules for appointment to public posts | 5-judge bench

Tej Prakash Pathak v Rajasthan High Court | Judgement: 7 November 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, P.S. Narasimha J, Pankaj Mithal J, Manoj Misra J

 This case is about whether public sector employers can alter selection rules after the process has commenced . The issue reached the Supreme Court after candidates who applied for a translator position at the Rajasthan High Court were not selected following a modification criteria. They argued that the 75 percent cut-off for the written examination was announced only after the exam for all and interviews of shortlisted candidates had taken place. 

Similar petitions from the High Courts of Kerala, Manipur, Gujarat, Gauhati and Patna were tagged with the case. The bench heard arguments state-by-state and dismissed each petition, including the one from Rajasthan. After three days of arguments, the bench reserved judgement on the broader issue of whether rules can be changed mid-process. 

The bench unanimously held that the rules cannot be altered after the recruitment process has already begun. The employer has discretion to make rules to find the most suitable candidate for a post. The recruiting authority can set benchmarks for different stages of evaluation in the appointment process but such benchmarks have to be stipulated before the commencement of the recruitment process. 

Validity of ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ Licence to Drive ‘Transport Vehicle’ | 5-judge bench

Bajaj Allianz General Insurance v Rambha Devi | Judgement: 6 November 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, P.S. Narasimha J, Pankaj Mithal J, Manoj Misra J

Section 2(21) of the Motor Vehicles Act (MVA), 1988, defines a light motor vehicle (LMV) as one weighing less than 7500 kilograms. In this case, a five-judge bench considered whether an LMV licence holder is automatically eligible to drive a transport vehicle weighing under 7500 kilograms. The bench also examined the correctness of Mukund Dewangan v Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2017), where it was ruled that a separate licence was unnecessary. 

The petitioners, primarily comprising insurance companies, argued that driving transport vehicles requires expertise that an LMV licence holder may lack. They highlighted that the MVA prescribes different age criteria for LMV and transport vehicle drivers, indicating the need for a distinct licence. They further argued that the licence should consider vehicle usage, not weight; for example, allowing an LMV licence holder to drive a small bus could be unsafe given the lack of bus-driving experience.

Respondents argued that a separate licence for “transport vehicles” applies only to medium and heavy transport vehicles (over 7500 kilograms). They asserted that the additional requirements for “transport vehicles” under the MVA should continue to apply only to medium and heavy vehicles.

The Court upheld Mukund Dewangan, stating that holders of a LMV licence can drive transport vehicles weighing under 7500 kilograms. It clarified that e-rickshaws, e-cars and vehicles carrying other hazardous goods would require a separate licence. The decision would bring a much needed relief to gig workers who use LMVs to transport small goods and persons. It is also expected to prevent the rejection of claims by insurance companies when Transport Vehicles are involved in accidents—claims were being rejected on the ground the driver of the Transport Vehicle did not have a proper licence. 

Challenge to the Abrogation of Article 370 | 5-judge bench 

In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution | Judgement: 11 December 2023

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, S.K. Kaul J, Sanjiv Khanna J, B.R. Gavai J, Surya Kant J

In a departure from ordinary practice, this particular bench comprised the five senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. Perhaps the Court that this arrangement was warranted by the political sensitivity of the case. The bench was tasked with determining the validity of the abrogation of Article 370, which took away the special status granted to the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Arguments spanned 16 days, marking it the longest Constitution Bench hearing in Justice Chandrachud’s tenure. Petitioners argued that Article 370 could only be revoked with the consent of the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly. As the Constituent Assembly had been dissolved, they claimed the special status was permanent. Additionally, petitioners argued that reorganising Jammu and Kashmir into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh was unconstitutional.

The Union government countered by stating that Article 370 was a temporary provision. It argued that the President of India had plenary powers to revoke the special status without the Constituent Assembly’s recommendations. Finally, the Union submitted that the reorganisation was constitutionally permissible, with the assurance that statehood would be restored once the region returned to normalcy.

The five-judge bench upheld the abrogation of Article 370 and did not address the reorganisation’s validity, accepting the Union government’s assurance of eventual statehood restoration. They observed that Article 370 was not permanent but rather a temporary measure to address Jammu and Kashmir’s unique needs and circumstances in the late 1940s and 1950s.

Constitutionality of the Electoral Bond Scheme | 5 Judge Bench

Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India | Judgement: 15 February 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Sanjiv Khanna J, B.R. Gavai J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J

On 16 October 2023, a three-judge bench referred the validity of the Electoral Bonds Scheme to a five-judge bench. The reference came nearly four years after the Supreme Court initially heard arguments challenging the Scheme. The arguments focused on the Scheme’s objective itself. Petitioners argued that the Scheme ran foul of free and fair elections by maintaining donor anonymity. It also facilitated a quid pro system between corporates and political parties and violated the ordinary citizen’s fundamental right to information. 

The Union government described the Scheme as “foolproof” and “unbreachable.” It argued that anonymity was necessary to protect donor privacy and shield them from potential retaliation by political parties. The Scheme, according to the Union, was intended to remove “unclean money” from Indian elections and curb black money circulation and corruption.

The Constitution Bench struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme. It held that the right to information applies to political parties and that the release of donor identities is essential for voters’ to make informed choices. The bench noted that the objective of curbing black money should not come at the cost of the right to information, emphasising alternative methods to address black money issues. Lastly, it recognised that corporate funding through electoral bonds could influence the electoral process.

Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 | 5-judge bench

In re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 | Judgement: 17 October 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Surya Kant J, M.M. Sundresh J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J

On the day the judgement in the Article 370 case was reserved, the Supreme Court announced three more Constitution Bench cases, including one on the validity of Section 6A, which crystallised the agreement in the Assam Accord. The Assam Accord was entered between Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress government at the Centre and student unions in Assam, which were protesting the influx of Bangladeshi migrants.

Under Section 6A, any person who entered Assam from Bangladesh before March 1971 was considered an Indian citizen. Petitioners argued that weak implementation of this provision continued to attract migration, altering Assam’s culture and demographics. Respondents, including the Union government, argued that petitioners were making a claim to exclusivity by claiming demographic change and erosion of indigenous culture.They also pointed out that Article 11 of the Constitution empowered the Union to make special laws on citizenship.

On 17 October 2024, in a 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court upheld the provision, noting that Section 6A only applied to migrants who entered before the March 1971 cut-off, deeming those who entered afterward illegal. Recognising implementation issues, the Court ordered Supreme Court-supervised hearings to identify and deport migrants who have entered after the cut-off. In dissent, Justice J.B. Pardiwala noted that Section 6A was flawed and should be struck down due to the passage of time (“temporal unreasonableness”) as the delay in identifying and deporting migrants had led to sustained migration into Assam. 

Automatic Vacation of Stay Orders | 5-judge bench

High Court Bar Association Allahabad v The State of Uttar Pradesh | Judgement: 29 February 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, A.S. Oka J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Pankaj Mithal J, Manoj Misra J

In Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency v Central Bureau of Investigation (2018), the Supreme Court held that a stay order automatically lapses within six months unless extended by a subsequent order. A five-judge bench reviewed the correctness of this decision in High Court Bar Association Allahabad.

Arguments were heard on 13 December 2023. Appellants argued that Asian Resurfacing amounted to “judicial legislation,” which courts should avoid, and that automatic vacation of stay orders lacks judicial consideration. The Union government also argued that automatic lapsing unfairly disadvantaged litigants who had secured a stay, submitting that timelines for stay orders should fall within parliamentary discretion.

The bench unanimously ruled that stay orders in pending cases should not automatically lapse after six months, overruling Asian Resurfacing. It held that the decision to vacate a stay should be based on judicial discretion to ensure fairness.

Appointment of arbitrators by ineligible persons | 5-judge bench

Central Organisation For Railway Electrification v ECL-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) | Judgement: 8 November 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, P.S. Narasimha J, Pankaj Mithal J, Manoj Misra J

The five-judge bench determined whether a person ineligible to be an arbitrator can appoint one. It also looked into the issue of unilateral selection of the panel from which arbitrators can be appointed by both parties. 

Over the span of three days in August 2024, appellants argued that the unilateral appointment of arbitration panels contradicts the principle of equality under the Arbitration Act and goes against public policy. Additionally, to maintain fairness, they contended that even a person who is ineligible to serve as an arbitrator should not have the authority to appoint one. The respondent, a public sector undertaking, countered that merely nominating arbitrators to a panel does not guarantee selection, as the opposing party retains the right to choose from the panel.

The bench held that no party, even if it is a government party, is entitled to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator. It also clarified that the government cannot insist on the opposing party choosing an arbitrator from a panel that it has unilaterally prepared. Justices Hrishikesh Roy and P.S. Narasimha, in separate opinions, observed that parties are free to choose their process for appointment with limited intervention from the court. The court will only be required to step in when there is no consensus among parties about the appointment. 

Legislative immunity for accepting bribes for speech or vote in the House | 7-judge bench 

Sita Soren v Union of India | Judgement: 4 March 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, A.S. Bopanna J, M.M. Sundresh J, P.S. Narasimha J, J.B. Pardiwala J, P.V. Sanjay Kumar J, Manoj Misra J

This was the first seven-judge bench convened by CJI Chandrachud. Originally listed as a five-judge matter, it was expanded because it addressed the correctness of a five-judge ruling in P.V. Narasimha Rao v State (1998). In P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Supreme Court held that legislators were immune from criminal prosecution related to their speeches and votes in the House. This immunity was extended to legislators who had voted against a no-confidence motion although a legislator who abstained after accepting a bribe was prosecuted.

Over two days of arguments, the appellant defended P.V. Narasimha Rao stating that it was “well reasoned” and “carefully considered.” Respondents and intervenors argued, however, that immunity should not shield those who undermine the legislative process. They contended that a healthy democracy leaves “no room for immunity for bribes.”

The seven-judge bench ultimately overruled P.V. Narasimha Rao, asserting that bribery corrupts democracy. It criticised the decision’s “paradoxical outcome,” where immunity was granted to those who took a bribe and acted on it, while those who refrained were prosecuted.

Validity of unstamped arbitration agreements | 7-judge bench 

In Re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under The Arbitration And Conciliation Act 1996 And The Indian Stamp Act 1899 | Judgement: 13 December 2023

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, S.K. Kaul J, Sanjiv Khanna J, B.R. Gavai J, Surya Kant J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J 

In N.N. Global v Indo Unique Flame (2023), a five-judge bench led by Justice K.M. Joseph ruled in a 3:2 majority that unstamped arbitration agreements are invalid and void. In September 2023, this decision was referred to a seven-judge bench for reconsideration.

Arguments occurred over two days in October 2023, with counsel contending that the Court’s role under the Arbitration Act is limited to confirming the existence of an arbitration agreement. They argued that the absence of a stamp on an arbitration agreement is a “curable defect” that can be rectified. Further, they maintained that an arbitration clause can exist independently of the contract itself, making it enforceable regardless of the contract’s unstamped status.

Respondents argued that an arbitration clause cannot exist separately from the unstamped agreement and pointed out that contract law deems unstamped agreements unenforceable.

The bench unanimously concluded that an unstamped arbitration agreement is not void ab initio but a curable defect. It determined that the validity of the arbitration agreement is for the arbitral tribunals to assess and not the courts.

Aligarh Muslim University’s minority status | 7-judge bench 

Aligarh Muslim University Through its Registrar Faizan Mustafa v Naresh Agarwal | Judgement: 8 November 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Sanjiv Khanna J, Surya Kant J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Dipankar Datta J, Manoj Misra J, S.C. Sharma J 

In Azeez Basha v Union of India (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that Aligarh Muslim University did not possess minority status under Article 30, as it was established through a Union legislation—the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920. Article 30 grants religious and linguistic minorities the right to “establish and administer” educational institutions. Following this decision, Parliament passed an amendment asserting that AMU was established by the “Muslims of India.” However, the Allahabad High Court struck down this amendment in 2005. The seven-judge bench was considering an appeal against this decision, which also questioned the correctness of Azeez Basha.

Petitioners, including AMU, contended that AMU was a minority institution since its foundation was rooted in the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College, which was recognised as a minority institution in Azeez Basha. They argued that all minority institutions with a similar historical background as AMU would risk losing their minority status due to the requirement of Union legislation for university establishment.

Conversely, the Union contended that AMU was not a minority institution because it was established by the British government. Additionally, it argued that MAO College forfeited its minority status upon its transformation into AMU.

The bench did not directly address the minority status of Aligarh Muslim University. However, in a 4:3 majority decision, it overruled the earlier decision in Azeez Basha and outlined the criteria for determining minority status. The majority held that an institution may achieve minority status if it is “established” by a person from a minority community. They reasoned that “administration” is a consequence of establishment and does not need to be a separate criterion. 

Validity of Sub-Classification Within Reserved Categories | 7-judge bench 

State of Punjab v Davinder Singh | Judgement: 1 August 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, B.R. Gavai J, Vikram Nath J, B.M. Trivedi J, Pankaj Mithal J, Manoj Misra J, S.C. Sharma J

In E.V. Chinnaiah v State of Andhra Pradesh (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Scheduled Caste community was a homogenous group, ruling out the possibility of sub-classification. Two decades later, this decision was up for reconsideration.

Most arguments favoured sub-classification, with petitioners contending that backwardness within the Scheduled Caste community varies in degree, making sub-classification necessary to address “backwardness within backwardness.” They argued that state-led sub-classification efforts did not alter the Presidential List of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as these exercises did not add or remove any communities.

A few respondents, however, argued that E.V. Chinnaiah was correct in holding that sub-classifications modify the Presidential List, asserting that the Scheduled Caste community is a homogenous group and states lack the authority to create sub-groups.

In a 6:1 majority, the bench upheld states’ power to create sub-groups within the Scheduled Caste community, finding that the group is not homogenous and that sub-classification does not alter the Presidential List, as no communities are added or removed. Justice Bela Trivedi dissented, countering that sub-classification deprives other castes in the Presidential List, violating Article 14. 

States power to tax mines and minerals | 9-judge bench 

Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India | Judgement: 25 July 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, A.S. Oka J, B.V. Nagarathna J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J, Ujjal Bhuyan J, S.C. Sharma J, A.G. Masih J

The Supreme Court’s first nine-judge bench decision in Justice Chandrachud’s term as CJI addressed the taxation of mines and minerals by state governments. The bench considered whether “royalty” under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 qualifies as a tax and if states may collect tax under Entry 50 of the State List. Entry 50 permits states to levy taxes on mineral rights, subject to Parliament’s laws for “mineral development.”

Respondents argued that since states own most mineral lands, the royalties received function as a tax. Appellants countered that royalty lacks tax characteristics, as it is simply payment from miners to landowners, who are not always state governments.

The issue reached the nine-judge bench after Kesoram Industries v State of West Bengal, a five-judge bench, questioned the correctness of India Cements v State of Tamil Nadu, a seven-judge bench, which held that “royalty is a tax.” On 25 July, in an 8:1 decision, the bench ruled that states can levy taxes on mines and minerals, while clarifying that “royalty” is not a tax. 

Two weeks later, the Court clarified that this judgement would apply retrospectively, allowing mining companies to settle unpaid taxes in instalments over 12 years, beginning in 2026. Justice B.V. Nagarathna dissented, stating that royalty was in the nature of a tax as it was a compulsory payment. She warned that the majority opinion will result in an unhealthy and uneven taxing regime that could favour mineral-rich states. 

States’ power to regulate industrial alcohol | 9-judge bench 

State of Uttar Pradesh v Lalta Prasad Vaish | Judgement: 23 October 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, A.S. Oka J, B.V. Nagarathna J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J, Ujjal Bhuyan J, S.C. Sharma J, A.G. Masih J

A nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court examined whether a state’s regulatory power over “intoxicating liquor” under Entry 8 of the State List includes industrial alcohol. In Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh (1989), a seven-judge bench previously held that “intoxicating liquor” refers solely to potable alcohol. 

Petitioners argued that Synthetics & Chemicals was incorrect, suggesting “intoxicating liquor” is a genus encompassing both potable and industrial alcohol, as the Constitution separately references “alcoholic liquor for human consumption” and “intoxicating liquor” under Entries 51 and 8, respectively. The Union government countered that Section 18G of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 had claimed control over industrial alcohol and that “intoxicating” referred solely to consumable alcohol, thus limiting state control to potable liquor.

In an 8:1 majority, the bench ruled that state governments have regulatory authority over industrial alcohol, overturning Synthetics & Chemicals by holding that Entry 8 includes all types of liquor, including industrial alcohol. Justice B.V. Nagarathna dissented, asserting that “intoxicating liquor” should not encompass industrial alcohol, given its critical role in India’s chemical industry, which, she held, should remain under Union control.

Nature of Private Property | 9-judge bench 

Property Owners Association v State of Maharashtra | Judgement: 5 November 2024

Judges: D.Y. Chandrachud CJI, Hrishikesh Roy J, B.V. Nagarathna J, Sudhanshu Dhulia J, J.B. Pardiwala J, Manoj Misra J, Rajesh Bindal J, S.C. Sharma J, A.G. Masih J

The nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court evaluated the interpretation of Article 39(b) of the Constitution, which is a Directive Principle enabling the state to control “material resources of the community” to serve the common good. This case emerged after Maharashtra amended a law allowing a state-run housing agency to acquire privately owned, dilapidated buildings in Mumbai, prompting the Court to determine if such privately owned property can be deemed a “material resource of the community.”

A key aspect of this case also concerned the scope and status of Article 31C. Originally added to protect laws made under Articles 39(b) and (c) from fundamental rights challenges, Article 31C was later amended to extend this protection to all directive principles. However, the Court struck down this amendment, and the nine-judge bench had to decide if the pre-amended, narrower version of Article 31C still stood in the Constitution.

Petitioners argued that privately owned property does not qualify as a “material resource,” given that it does not generate services or wealth for the community and remains individually owned. They further argued that Article 31C, as initially drafted, no longer exists, as striking down an amendment does not automatically restore a prior version.

The Union and the Maharashtra government argued that private property can become a community resource if it subserves the common good. They added that though private property is individually owned it is a material resource for the persons living in the building. Lastly, they contended that the pre-amended version of Article 31C was still on the books and only the amendment was struck down, with the consequence of protecting laws advancing DPSPs from fundamental rights challenges. 

In 8:1 majority, the bench held that not all individual property was a “material resource of the community”. In a unanimous decision, the bench also held that the pre-amended, narrower version of Article 31C still exists in the Constitution. In a partial dissent, Justice Nagarathna disagreed with the part of CJI Chandrachud’s opinion critiquing former judges who had held that all private property was a material resource of the community.